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FLORIDA TORT LAW: KEEPING FLORIDA'S IMPACT
RULE IN STEP WITH SOCIETY
Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2002)
Whitney CarsonHarper*
Petitioners, a married couple, sought the help of Respondent, a licensed
psychotherapist, in resolving their marital troubles.' Each of the Petitioners
visited Respondent individually, and at Respondent's request divulged
highly sensitive and personal information during their sessions with
Respondent.2 Although Respondent was under a statutory and common
law fiduciary duty to hold the disclosed information in confidence,3
Respondent told each Petitioner what the other Petitioner had said.4
Petitioners alleged that Respondent breached the statutory duty of
confidentiality imposed by section 491.0147 of the Florida Statutes and
should therefore be held liable for the emotional distress which ensued.,
At trial, Respondent made a motion for dismissal on the grounds that
Florida's impact rule precluded recovery for Petitioners in the absence of
a physical injury or impact.6 The trial court granted Respondent's motion7
* For my family, whose love and support have never wavered, and for Greg-for all that
you are to me, I am legally yours.
1. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Respondent was under a statutory duty imposed by section 491.0147 of the Florida
Statutes, which provides that "any communication between any person licensed or certified under
this chapter and her or his patient or client shall be confidential." FLA. STAT. § 491.0147 (2002)
(psychotherapists are licensed under chapter 491).
4. Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 351. Apparently, Respondent Eaker told Mr. Gracey that his wife
was "'trailer trash' with low moral standards" and told Mrs. Gracey that her husband was not smart
enough for her. Laurie Cunningham, The Impact of Betrayal, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REv., Feb. 10,
2003, at A15.
5. Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 351 & n.2. Petitioners asserted that Respondent was attempting to
end Petitioners' marriage by convincing them to divorce, rather than trying to mend the marriage.
Id. at 351. In addition to emotional distress damages, Petitioners sued to recover fees for further
therapeutic counseling to repair the damage done by Respondent's breach. Id.
6. Id. When a plaintiff is seeking damages for emotional distress, the impact rule permits
recovery in two situations. First, a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress when it is
caused by an actual physical impact. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1985).
Alternatively, in the absence of a physical impact upon the plaintiff, when a plaintiff suffers
emotional distress which is brought about by the sight or sound of physical impact upon another
(or the immediate aftermath of that impact), and the actually-impacted person and the plaintiff
share a close emotional bond such that one would expect such an event to have a severe effect on
the plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover damages if he experiences physical manifestations of his
emotional distress. See id. at 18-20.
7. Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 350.
1093
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and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, certifying a
question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court: whether
Florida should recognize an exception to the impact rule in the instance of
a breach8 of a statutory duty of confidence which causes emotional
injuries.

The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the question certified by the
district court to be more specific to the facts before the court: whether the
impact rule should apply when emotional injuries result from a
psychotherapist's breach of the statutory duty of confidentiality.9 The
Florida Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, and HELD
that the impact rule did not apply to a suit for emotional distress damages
when a psychotherapist breached the statutorily imposed duty of
confidentiality that existed between the psychotherapist and patient.'°
As early as 1893, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the impact rule
as governing recovery for mental and emotional distress." In International
Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders, the recipient of a telegraph sued the
telegraph company for the mental and emotional damages which ensued
when the company failed to promptly deliver the news of the recipient's
wife's near-death condition. 2 By the time the telegraph was delivered to
the recipient, his wife had already died.' 3 Had the telegraph company
promptly delivered the telegraph, the recipient would have had enough
time to go to his wife and be by her side in her last hours.' 4 The recipient
sued the telegraph company for its infliction of "great mortification,
anguish and pain of mind and injury to his feelings and affections."' 5
Denying the telegraph recipient any recovery for his mental and
emotional distress, the court invoked the impact rule and held that in the
absence of physical injury or incidental damage to the claimant there was
no cause of action and measure of damages for mental suffering alone.' 6
The court refused to adopt a significant body of case law from courts in
other states allowing recovery in such a situation, noting that none of those

8. Id. The reference ofthis question to the Florida Supreme Court evidences the concern that
the rule is inappropriate and overly harsh for the instant situation and the desire for an outcome
which is contrary to that required under the correct impact rule.
9. Id. at 350-51.
10. Id. at 351.
11. Int'l Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 14 So. 148 (Fla. 1893). The Florida Supreme Court's
decision in International Ocean is accepted as the beginning of Florida's impact rule. R.J. v.
Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995); see also Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048,
1053 n.7 (Fla. 1995); Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593, 601 (Fla. 1974) (Adkins, J.,
dissenting).
12. Int'l Ocean, 14 So. at 148-49.
13. Id.at 148.
14. Id.
15. Id.at 148-49.
16. Id. at 151-52.
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opinions provided a means by which the damages could accurately be
determined. 7 The court also noted that it would be impossible to prove a
mental injury without physical evidence.' In the face of these two
perceived impossibilities, the court expressed grave doubts in the ability
of a jury to make a just and fair decision that was not "dictated by whim
or arbitrary caprice."' 9 Thus, the court declined to allow recovery for
mental injury alone.2"
More than ninety years after InternationalOcean,the Florida Supreme
Court modified the impact rule 2' to fit the contemporary public policy of
the state.22 In Champion v. Gray, the court loosened the definition of the
traditional impact rule to allow recovery for mental stress in the absence
of a physical impact when the plaintiff showed a severe physical
manifestation of that mental stress.23 In Champion,a mother heard a car hit
her daughter and immediately thereafter arrived on the scene to find her
daughter dead.24 At the sight of her dead child, the mother suffered' 25such
severe sadness and shock that she "collapsed and died on the spot.
The court was extremely reluctant to bar recovery for such an extreme
injury as death, and created a limited exception to the impact rule.26 The
17. Id. at 150-51.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 151. In its opinion the court expressed an overt distrust of the jury's ability to
decide anything that was not blatantly obvious. See id.
20. Id. at 151-52.
21. After InternationalOcean, the impact rule required a plaintiffto prove that his emotional
distress flowed from a direct physical impact upon his person in order for the plaintiff to recover
for emotional distress. See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995) (discussing
the history of the impact rule in Florida). In Championv. Gray, the court broadened the impact rule
to allow recovery for emotional distress when the plaintiff did not actually suffer an impact, so long
as the plaintiff suffered a physical injury or manifestation of his emotional trauma and other
foreseeability factors were met. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985). Note that
Florida's impact rule was judicially-created, so the court can modify or even eliminate it at will.
Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1974).
22. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20. The court noted "that the public policy of this state is to
compensate for physical injuries, with attendant lost wages, and physical and mental suffering
which flow from the consequences of the physical injuries." Id. To meet these goals, the court was
willing to modify the impact rule, although not to the point that the rule would allow "purely
subjective and speculative damages for psychic trauma alone." Id. The court recognized the
arbitrary nature of any such limitation, but found the undesirability of an arbitrary limitation to be
outweighed by the need to prevent fraudulent claims and to limit claims that have no definable
measure of damages. Id.
23. Id. Specifically, the court held "that a claim exists for damages flowing from a significant
discernible physical injury when such injury is caused by psychic trauma resulting from negligent
injury imposed on another who, because of his relationship to the injured party and his involvement
in the event causing that injury, is foreseeably injured." Id.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 18-19.
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court held that a plaintiff could recover for a physical manifestation of a
"psychic trauma" when there was no physical impact upon the plaintiff, so
long as the trauma to the plaintiff was the direct result of an injury to
another.27 Additionally, it must be foreseeable that such an injury to
another would cause the plaintiff s injury. 8 Immediately after announcing
its holding, the court explicitly clarified that it would not recognize a claim
for mental or emotional injury without direct impact absent an
accompanying physical injury.29
Whereas in Championthe court recognized a specific exception to the
impact rule and amended the rule to fit this exception, in Kush v. Lloyd,3"
the court used a different method to avoid application of the impact rule.3
In Kush, one of the issues the court addressed was whether parents could
have a cause of action for the mental distress they suffered attendant to the

27. Id. The court "emphasize[d] the requirement that a causally connected clearly discernable
physical impairment must accompany or occur within a short time of the psychic injury." Id.
28. Id. at 20. In determining the foreseeability of the plaintiffs injury, the court set forth two
criteria. Id. First, the court required that the plaintiff have direct involvement in the event which
caused the primary injury, and second, that the plaintiff share an emotionally close relationship with
the primarily injured party. Id. The court expanded on the idea of a direct involvement with the
event, noting that if a person "sees [the event], hears [the event], or arrives upon the scene while
the injured party is still there, that person is likely involved." Id. As to the close relationship
between the directly injured party and the party claiming emotional distress, the court provided that
certainly an immediate family member, such as "[a] child, a parent, or a spouse would qualify," and
that others may qualify depending on the circumstances of the relationship. Id.
The court based its foreseeability analysis on that of the California Supreme Court in Dillon v.
Legg. Champion, 478 So. 2d. at 19-20 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968)).
Dillon required the court to consider the location of the plaintiff relative to the location of the
impact; the method by which the plaintiff learned of the impact; and the closeness of the
relationship between the plaintiff and the impacted party. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal.
1968).
29. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20 n.4. In Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Division, 468 So. 2d
903 (Fla. 1985), decided on the same day as Champion, the Florida Supreme Court denied recovery
to the plaintiff because he suffered no physical injury resulting from his mental and emotional
trauma. Brown, 468 So. 2d at 904. The plaintiff in Brown struck and killed his own mother while
he was driving a Cadillac with a faulty accelerator pedal. Id. at 903. Although the plaintiff was
certainly involved in the primary impact to his mother, and had a close emotional tie to her, the
court ruled that he had not met all of the Champion requirements. Id. at 904. In particular, the
plaintiff suffered neither a direct physical injury, nor a physical manifestation of his emotional and
mental distress, either one of which would have allowed him to recover damages. Id.
30. 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992).
31. Id. Kush is an oft-cited case in which the court found the impact rule to be inapplicable
to the facts before it, rather than modifying the rule so that its application to the facts would not
preclude recovery as the court did in Champion. See Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 355-56 (Fla.
2002); Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 1234, 1237-38 (Fla. 2001); Tanner v. Hartog,
696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997); Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade County Pub. Health Trust, 651 So. 2d
673, 675 (Fla. 1995); R.J, v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1995).
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wrongful birth of a child. 32 The parents in Kush brought a wrongful birth
claim against the physician who misdiagnosed their first child's disorder
as non-genetic and led the parents to believe that they could safely bear
more children without fear that future children would have the same
disorder as the first child.33 The parents relied on this diagnosis and bore
a second child who did, indeed, have the same disorder as the first.34 Tests
later revealed that the children's disorder was genetic.35
Upholding the district court's ruling on this point, the court held that
the impact rule did not apply to a suit for emotional or mental distress
attendant to a claim for wrongful birth. 36 The court reasoned that mental
anguish was a natural side-effect of the facts underlying a claim for
wrongful birth, and that it would be contrary to public policy and common
sense to deny the existence of such a cause of action.37 The court compared
the wrongful birth claim to claims for defamation and invasion of privacy,
causes of action which are outside the realm of the impact rule because the
damages are primarily emotional.3" The court reasoned that if emotional
damages are recognized in a case against one who spreads lies about the
plaintiff, then such damages must also be recognized in a case against one
who negligently gives medical advice to parents, resulting in the birth of
a child with a severe genetic disorder.39 Thus, rather than amending the
impact rule as it did in Champion, the court altogether declined to apply
the impact rule to cases for emotional damages resulting from a wrongful
birth.40

32. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 421-22. An action for wrongful birth is "a lawsuit brought by parents
against a doctor for failing to advise them prospectively about the risks of their having a child with
birth defects." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (7th ed. 1999).
33. Id. at 417-18.
34. Id. at417.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 422-23. The court did not say that on these facts, if the plaintiff meets certain
criteria, then he will have satisfied the impact rule, but rather the court declined to apply the impact
rule to this brand of case entirely, creating a carve-out in the "jurisdiction" of the impact rule. See
id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1953)
(including emotional damages as a part of that category of damages which need not be proved by
evidence in a libel and defamation case, since they "necessarily result from the publication of the
libelous matter"); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (construing the word "person" to
include the mental, as well as the physical person, which must be protected from invasions of

privacy); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 569,570, 652H cmt. b (1977) (noting that recovery
for emotional damages may be had in cases of defamation/libel, slander, or invasion of privacy,
respectively, without any requirement that the plaintiff show a physical injury).
39. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422-23.
40. Id. at 423.
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Mirroring its reasoning in Kush, the instant court declared the cause of

action in the instant case, for emotional damages resulting from the breach
of the statutory duty of confidentiality between a psychotherapist and
patient, to be outside the coverage of the impact rule.4 Even so, the court
reiterated the value of the impact rule as a general rule of tort law and
declined to completely abrogate it.42 Thus, although the impact rule still
stands as the general rule of recovery for emotional damages in Florida tort
law, the cause of action for breach of the duty established by section
491.0147 is no longer subject to the requirements or application of the
impact rule.43

In addition to its prior decision in Kush, the court relied on an analysis
of legislative intent in the creation of section 491.0147, Florida Statutes,
ultimately concluding that the instant case should not be subject to the

impact rule.44 Giving effect to the legislature's intent in creating section

41. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 357 (Fla. 2002). Note that section 491.0147 of the
Florida Statutes creates exceptions in the duty of confidentiality for situations in which a danger
to a third party (a spouse or another person) or to the patient exists, and provides that disclosure of
confidential information to a spouse is permissible in these instances. FLA. STAT. § 491.0147
(2002). Specifically, the statute provides:
Any communication between any person licensed or certified under this
chapter and her or his patient or client shall be confidential. This secrecy may be
waived under the following conditions:
(1) When the person licensed or certified under this chapter is a party
defendant to a civil, criminal, or disciplinary action arising from a complaint filed
by the patient or client, in which case the waiver shall be limited to that action.
(2) When the patient or client agrees to the waiver, in writing, or, when more
than one person in a family is receiving therapy, when each family member agrees
to the waiver, in writing.
(3) When there is a clear and immediate probability of physical harm to the
patient or client, to other individuals, or to society and the person licensed or
certified under this chapter communicates the information only to the potential
victim, appropriate family member, or law enforcement or other appropriate
authorities.
Id.
42. Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 358. The court stated:
Six years ago, this Court stated its belief in the overall efficacy of the impact rule:
We reaffirm ... our conclusion that the impact rule continues to serve its
purpose of assuring the validity of claims for emotional or psychic damages, and
find that the impact rule should remain part of the law of this state.
Id. (citing R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1995)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 357-58.
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491.0147,"5 the court found a private cause of action implicit in the statute,
even though there was no cause of action explicitly created.46 In order to
give effect to the new-found cause of action, and following its reasoning
in Kush,47 the court mentioned that the damages resulting from a
psychotherapist's breach of confidentiality would almost certainly be
emotional rather than physical, and so the impact rule should not apply.4"
Through this analysis of authority,4 9 the instant court declared the cause of
action for a breach of the duty created by section 491.0147 not only to
exist, but also to be outside the realm of Florida's impact rule, and thus to
require no proof of physical impact or injury to allow recovery.5 °

45. Section 491.002 of the Florida Statutes expresses the Legislature's intent in creating
section 491:
The Legislature finds that as society becomes increasingly complex, emotional
survival is equal in importance to physical survival. Therefore, in order to
preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the public, the Legislature must provide
privileged communication for members of the public or those acting on their
behalf to encourage needed or desired counseling, clinical and psychotherapy
services, or certain other services of a psychological nature to be sought out. The
Legislature further finds that, since such services assist the public primarily with
emotional survival, which in turn affects physical and psychophysical survival, the
practice of clinical social work, marriage and family therapy, and mental health
counseling by persons not qualified to practice such professions presents a danger
to public health, safety, and welfare.

§ 491.002 (2002).
46. Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 354-55. The court noted that in at least two other Florida cases, the
plaintiffs were permitted to sue for breach of statutory duty when no cause of action was explicitly
created in the statute imposing the duty. Id. at 355 n. 10 (citing Lewis v. City of Miami, 173 So. 150
(Fla. 1937); Alford v. Meyer, 201 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)). In addition, otherjurisdictions
have allowed suit for breaches of statutory duty without the explicit statutory delineation of a cause
of action. Id. at 355.
47. The notion that the impact rule generally does not apply to torts like defamation, invasion
of privacy, loss of consortium, and wrongful birth, in which the damages are primarily emotional,
weighs heavily in favor of excluding this new-found cause of action from the scope of the impact
rule. Id. at 356. For these causes of action, it makes sense that recovery for purely emotional injury
must be allowed.
48. Id. (citing Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 422-23 (Fla. 1992) and Tanner v. Hartog, 696
So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1997) in support of this proposition). In reaching this conclusion, the instant court
adopted the reasoning of the New York appellate court in MacDonaldv.Clinger.Gracey, 837 So.
2d at 357 (discussing MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S. 801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)). In
MacDonald,which was based on facts nearly identical to those of the instant case, the New York
court found a cause of action implied in the breach of a fiduciary duty, requiring no showing of
physical impact or injury for recovery. Id. at 804.
49. In addition to the legislative intent and Kush, the court also relied on MacDonald,an outof-state, but persuasive, authority in favor of its decision. Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 357.
50. Id.
FLA. STAT.
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By removing the cause of action from the scope of the impact rule's
application, as it did in Kush, the instant court preserved the efficacy of the
impact rule, while making a specific allowance for emotional distress
damages in an instance in which reason demanded that recovery be
permitted.5 Had the court attempted to rework the impact rule so that
recovery would be permitted in the instant case, the impact or injury
requirement would have become toothless and the impact rule would have
been effectively erased from Florida's jurisprudence. 2 However, if the
court had simply applied the impact rule and refused to allow recovery in
the instant case, the intent of the legislature in creating section 491.0147,
the basic principles of tort law and several compelling public policy goals
would have been thwarted." Ultimately, the court took the only course of
action practically available4 to it, and removed the cause of action from the
scope of the impact rule.
If the instant court had amended the impact rule in order to
accommodate the instant case and allow recovery, the effect of the rule
would be greatly diluted.5 In order to accommodate the instant case, the
court would have had to accept the psychotherapist's breach of confidence
as an impact, erasing the requirement that the impact be physical. 6
Without the central requirement of a physical impact or injury, the rule
would effectively, if not explicitly, be abrogated entirely. The impact rule
would simply have become a restatement of the elements of negligence,
requiring only that the plaintiff prove that the defendant owed and
breached a duty, and that the breach caused damage to the plaintiff. 7 This
destruction of the impact rule would potentially permit the precise evil that

51. See id.
52. The purpose of the impact rule is to provide assurance, beyond the usual requirements
of causation and damages, that the person upon whom liability is to be imposed actually caused the
harm complained of, and that the damage is actually present. See infra note 58. Thus, the impact
rule requires a layer of proof (proof ofphysical impact or injury) in addition to the elements of the
underlying cause of action before liability will be imposed and recovery can be had. See supra note
6. Without the requirement of physical impact or injury, the impact rule would be a mere
redundancy, as it would require nothing more to assure that the elements of causation and damages
are met than does the underlying cause of action.
53. See Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 357-58.
54. See id.
55. If the court had amended the rule in this manner, it would have been following the
Champion model of impact rule modification, reworking the definition of the rule. See Champion
v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18-19 (Fla. 1985) (creating an exception to the impact rule to allow
recovery for emotional distress which results from witnessing an impact, or the aftermath of that
impact, on another with whom the plaintiff has a close relationship).
56. See supra note 6.
57. See, e.g., Florida Power and Light Co. v. Lively, 465 So. 2d 1270, 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985) (stating that the "essential elements of negligence from which liability will flow are duty,
breach of duty, legal cause and damage") (citing W. PROSSER, TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1979)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/6

8

Harper: Florida Tort Law: Keeping Florida's Impact Rule in Step with Soci
CASE COMMENT

the rule was created to prevent: the floodgates of tort law would be flung
wide open, and litigious individuals would be borne upon a swift stream
to recovery, justified or not."
If the court had applied the impact rule as it stood after Champion, the
dismissal of the instant case would have been upheld, even in the face of
59
legislative intent and public policy which required the opposite result.
Applying the impact rule to the instant case would have precluded the
court from finding a cause of action implied in section 491.0147, because
the impact rule would not allow a cause of action for emotional damages
only.6" Common sense and public policy stand completely opposed to such
58. See I Thomas M. Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 96-97 & 97 n.83 (3d ed. 1906) (noting that the impact rule
was created out of fear that allowing recovery for emotional distress without any physical
component would open the floodgates for speculative and false claims); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking
Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 817-18 (1985) (noting that the fear
of "floodgate opening" exists, but suggesting that such a possibility could be precluded if the rules
created to assuage those fears were more appropriately focused).
In International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders, Championv. Gray, Kush v. Lloyd, and the
instant case, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized the need for the impact rule to remain intact
and effectual. See Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 358; Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 n.5 (Fla. 1992);
Champion,478 So. 2d at 20; Int'l Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 14 So. 148, 151-52 (Fla. 1893). The
impact rule still serves to prevent fraud and unjustified recovery in those cases to which it applies,
by requiring proof of an injury or impact either causing or caused by the emotional distress. This
is an important function because juries are not presented with any standards to use in determining
whether there has actually been an emotional injury caused by the defendant. But cf Gracey, 837
So. 2d at 359 (Pariente, J., concurring) (asserting that the court should allow juries to "determine
fault and damages surrounding claims of purely mental injuries," given that juries are already
entrusted with the determination of damages for pain and suffering, both of which are certainly
intangible, in cases where the underlying injury satisfies the impact rule).
In those cases where societal knowledge, science, and technology have not advanced far enough
to permit a reasonably certain finding absent physical impact or injury, the court has left the impact
rule in place to prevent abuse of the tort law system. See, e.g., Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div.,
468 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1985) (denying recovery for emotional distress in the absence of physical
impact or injury to the plaintiff). In those cases that the court has removed from the reach of the
rule, the court apparently has found that the ordinary citizen possesses enough knowledge to make
a competent decision on this point, guided by the available science and technology as presented by
the parties. See, e.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2002).
59. The impact rule as it stood after Championwould have required dismissal of the instant
case because there was no primary physical impact to either plaintiff, and neither plaintiff exhibited
any serious physical manifestations of the emotional distress he or she suffered. See Champion,478
So. 2d at 17, 18. Even if the plaintiffs had exhibited such a physical manifestation, it is unclear
under Champion whether recovery would be permitted, since there was no primary physical impact
to another, at the sight of which the plaintiff became distressed and suffered physical injuries due
to the distress. Id.
60. As mentioned above, the court examined legislative intent and found that for the statute
to have any point at all there must be an implicit cause of action, Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 357.
Otherwise, the statute is an empty mandate that psychotherapists not break confidence, with no
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a result. Mental and emotional well-being is recognized as an immensely
important aspect of human life,6 and to refuse to recognize a cause of
action to protect the mental and emotional well-being of a plaintiff who
claims injury would be to deny the importance of this aspect of
humanity.6 2 A mental health provider-a psychotherapist, for example, can
be held accountable for his negligent actions in his professional capacity
only if recovery is permitted for emotional damages alone, since a
psychotherapist's job centers around the patient's mental and emotional
well-being.
The instant court took the only course of action that was appropriate in
this case-to remove the cause of action from the scope of the impact rule.
Allowing the instant case to go forward was a perfectly sensible decision,
as the damages in this cause of action were almost certain to be emotional
rather than physical.63 Additionally, the court's decision to exclude this
cause of action from the impact rule's scope allows the recognition of a
legitimate claim' and permits the plaintiff to plead his case truthfully,

repercussions for disobedience. See id.
61. The importance of mental and emotional well-being is evidenced by the everyday public
recognition of emotional distress as well as by the prevalence of healthcare providers in the field
of mental health, see Ingber, supra note 58, at 773, and by the legislature's action in creating
section 491.0147 on behalf of the people of Florida. See FLA. STAT. § 491.002 (2002).
62. See Ingber, supranote 58, at 781. Ingber notes that "[t]o the extent that pain and suffering
and emotional distress are real injuries, denial of compensation creates the appearance of legal and
societal indifference to the victim's plight," and that the remedy to this appearance of apathy is for
society to provide an award of damages to such victims. Id. The suggestion here is that such an
award is a "put your money where your mouth is" form of evidence, solidifying the societal
recognition of the great importance of mental health and elevating it from idle chatter to cash. See
id.
In addition to the affirming nature of a favorable verdict, Ingber notes the possibility that a
damages award for intangible injuries may provide further benefit, since the money a victim
receives may actually encourage the victim to seek professional treatment. Id. at 781-82. The
benefit of such a result accrues to the victim, in that the victim receives treatment to improve his
condition and make him whole, and to the cause of recognition of intangible injuries as legitimate,
since the victim's use of the monetary award to cure his ills implies that there must have been an
actual injury to the victim and not just a desire to secure a windfall. Id. In a sense, this is a selflegitimizing and self-fulfilling cycle: the victim receives a damages award, which affirms the
victim's belief that his injury is legitimate; the victim uses that award to pay for treatment to
ameliorate his injury, reaffirming to society-at-large that his injury is real and significant since he
would not likely use the money to treat a non-existent condition; and society thus becomes more
willing to recognize intangible injuries as compensable in future cases, beginning the cycle again.
Id. Of course, this cycle would likely not continue in the same direction if victims consistently used
their damages awards to throw elaborate parties or put down payments on yachts or houses, among
other examples of non-remedial uses. See id. at 783-84.
63. In this sense, the instant cause of action is similar to claims for defamation, invasion of
privacy, or wrongful birth, to which the impact rule does not apply. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
64. Tort law certainly does not require or allow recovery for every injury. There may be some
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without encouraging the plaintiff to stretch the truth to meet the
requirements of the rule.65 The instant court's adoption of the Kush
method, simply removing a cause of action from the scope of the impact
rule's application rather than amending the rule itself, was a responsible
choice which preserves the integrity of the tort system.66
Future courts deciding whether or not to apply or amend the impact
rule must carefully consider the implications of each choice on the
continued efficacy of the rule. Until the time when the impact rule is
completely unnecessary, courts must take care when amending the rule so
that it does not become ineffectual and empty. The instant court's use of
the Kush model of impact-rule avoidance was an appropriate and careful
response to changes in society, which demanded analogous changes to the
law. As all aspects of society continue to advance, the impact rule must
also march along, but not ahead or behind.67

legitimate claims for which the impact doctrine precludes recovery. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d
466, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (Reed, C.J., dissenting). In Stewart, Chief Judge Reed notes:
The impact doctrine gives practical recognition to the thought that not every injury
which one person may by his negligence inflict upon another should be
compensated in money damages. There must be some level of harm which one
should absorb without recompense as the price he pays for living in an organized
society.
Id. However, the principles of the American legal system also do not permit the arbitrary denial of
legitimate claims.
65. In the presence of a rule requiring an impact as a predicate for recovery, a plaintiff might
be encouraged to exaggerate the severity of his minor bumps and bruises or to falsely claim the
occurrence of even the most benign touch in order to surmount this obstacle to recovery. See, e.g.,
Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 359 (Pariente, J., concurring) (citing Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602,
608 (I11.1991), which notes that the impact rule encourages dishonesty and exaggeration). This is
especially true if, as is likely in the instance of a "sympathetic" case, the plaintiff suspects that the
court will require him to show very little impact to satisfy the rule. In such a case, it is as if the
impact rule encourages both the court and the plaintiff to exaggerate the actual impact and
minimize the impact rule's requirement until the two, truth and the rule, meet at some point in the
middle. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 363-64 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed., W. Publ'g Co. 1984) (pointing out the trifling contacts which have often been held to satisfy
the "magic formula" of the impact rule). A rule which operates in this manner only degrades the
integrity of the legal system, making the required elements of substantive law seem laughable and
insignificant. When such flimsy requirements are discarded, however, the court and all who take
part in the legal system can, and should, take the law much more seriously and hold it in higher
esteem.
66. See Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 356. This method of avoiding the impact rule prevents the
arbitrary denial of legitimate claims, while at the same time circumventing the potential flood of
illegitimate claims that would result from a complete abrogation of the impact rule. Id.
67. See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593,594 (Fla. 1974) (noting that "in this fast changing
world the general welfare requires from time to time reconsideration of old concepts").
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